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CONTRACT LAW & RACIAL INEQUALITY: A
PRIMER
DANIELLE KIE HART†
INTRODUCTION
America was founded on institutionally recognized and
supported oppression, namely, slavery and conquest.1 So, the fact
that the inequality spawned by this oppression continues to exist
today should surprise absolutely no one. That said, the extent of
the racialized social and economic inequality that pervades
American society today is being exposed in horrifying and glaring
detail, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
African Americans, the Latinx community, indigenous
communities, and immigrants are at much greater risk of getting
sick and dying from COVID-192 because of now widely†
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the text are mine alone. Southwestern Law School provided generous research
support, for which I am grateful. I also need to thank my research assistants Kimberly
Morosi, Ting Yu Lo, Willow Karfiol, and Alexandra Christensen for their invaluable
help. Finally, I would like to thank Michelle Scanlon, the Managing Editor, and all of
the other editors at the St. John’s Law Review for their professionalism and assistance
in editing my article. Any remaining errors are mine.
1
While the United States Constitution makes no explicit mention of slavery, it
nevertheless granted legal recognition of its existence by: (i) determining state
populations, for the purposes of apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes,
“by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a
term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; (ii) forbidding Congress to prohibit “importation of such
persons as any of the States . . . shall think proper to admit” before 1808, U.S. CONST.
art. I, §9, cl. 1; and (iii) forbidding states from enacting any law that would alter the
status of any escaping “person held to service or labour” in another state, and
requiring that such person “be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service
or labour may be due,” U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3. See generally William Van
Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 775, 775–78 (1979). With respect to conquest, see generally Joseph William
Singer, Property, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 240, 248 (David
Kairys 3d ed., 1998) [hereinafter, Singer, Property]; Joseph William Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991) [hereinafter, Singer,
Sovereignty]; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1716–
20 (1992).
2
Tracking the COVID-19 Economy’s Effect on Food, Housing, and Employment
Hardships, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES [hereinafter Tracking the COVID-19
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acknowledged systemic health and social inequality and inequity.3
More specifically, in July 2021, the CDC reported that the death
rate for African Americans was 2.0 times higher than the death
rate for whites, for American Indians and Alaskan Natives the
death rate was 2.4 times higher, and for Hispanics/Latinx people
the death rate was 2.3 times higher.4
The economic devastation wrought by the pandemic is also
being felt disproportionately by people of color. According to the
Pew Research Center, 61% of Hispanic Americans and 44% of
Black Americans suffered job or wage losses in April 2020 due to
the pandemic, compared to 38% of white adults.5 As of October
2021, the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities reported that
“renters of color were more likely to report that their household[s]
[were] not caught up on rent: 28 percent of Black renters, 18
percent of Latino renters, and 20 percent of Asian renters said
they were not caught up on rent, compared to 12% of white
renters.”6 Black and Hispanic adults were also more likely than
their white counterparts to be unable to pay some or all of their
bills.7 Not surprisingly, given the job and wage data, more than
twice as many Black (37.4%) and Hispanic adults (39.3%) were
food insecure as compared to white adults (17.6%).8

Economy’s Effect], https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/tracking-thecovid-19-recessions-effects-on-food-housing-and (last updated Oct. 21, 2021); Tiffany
Ford et al., Race Gaps in COVID-19 Deaths Are Even Bigger Than They Appear,
BROOKINGS (June 16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/16/racegaps-in-covid-19-deaths-are-even-bigger-than-they-appear/
[https://perma.cc/7FC3YJQ5]; see, e.g., Health Equity Considerations & Racial & Ethnic Minority Groups, CDC
(Apr. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Health Equity Considerations], https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/
54QC-UK6L]; The Editors, Too Many Black Americans Are Dying from COVID-19,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug 1, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/too-many-black-americans-are-dying-from-covid-19/.
3
See, e.g., Health Equity Considerations, supra note 2; see also The Editors, supra
note 2.
4
Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-byrace-ethnicity.html (updated July 16, 2021).
5
Mark Hugo Lopez et al., Financial and Health Impacts of COVID-19 Vary
Widely by Race and Ethnicity, PEW RES. CTR. (May 5, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/05/financial-and-health-impacts-ofcovid-19-vary-widely-by-race-and-ethnicity/ [https://perma.cc/4MXL-GAYR].
6
Tracking the COVID-19 Economy’s Effect, supra note 2.
7
Id.
8
Steven Brown, The COVID-19 Crisis Continues to Have Uneven Economic
Impact by Race and Ethnicity, URB. INST.: URB. WIRE (July 1, 2020),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/covid-19-crisis-continues-have-uneven-economic-
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In contrast, Wall Street and American billionaires were doing
phenomenally well during the COVID-19 pandemic.9 The United
States apparently minted 56 new billionaires between mid-March
and December 22, 2020, bringing the total number of American
billionaires to a whopping 659.10 The wealth of American
billionaires actually increased by more than $1 trillion since the
pandemic began.11 On November 27, 2020, a headline by the
Associated Press read, “Stocks rise on Wall Street as S&P 500 hits
record high.”12 But an October 16, 2020, New Yorker story by John
Cassidy captured the chasm that exists in American society best.
Cassidy wrote that, between June and September 2020, “the
number of Americans living in poverty [rose] by about six million,”
with the largest increase affecting African Americans—18.2% in
June to 22.8% in September.13 In comparison, during the three
month period from July to September, Morgan Stanley posted $2.7
billion in profits, “a rise of twenty-five per cent compared to a year
ago.”14 Goldman Sachs did even better—“it announced quarterly
profits of $3.62 billion, virtually double what the firm earned in
the same quarter in 2019.”15
The punch line to all of this is one that we have seen and heard
before—even in times of national and global crisis, the Haves come
out ahead. But two important details are obscured and therefore

impact-race-and-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/Y6JA-LCED]; see also Tracking the
COVID-19 Economy’s Effect, supra note 2.
9
See Carmen Ang, The Rich Got Richer During COVID-19. Here’s How American
CAPITALIST
(Dec.
30,
2020),
Billionaires
Performed,
VISUAL
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-rich-got-richer-during-covid-19-heres-howamerican-billionaires-performed/ [https://perma.cc/QRB9-YHBV]; see also Martha C.
White, Wall Street Minted 56 New Billionaires Since the Pandemic Began—but Many
Families Are Left Behind, NBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2020, 10:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/business/business-news/wall-street-s-best-year-ever-why-pandemic-has-been-n1252512
[https://perma.cc/5LLT-VK86].
10
White, supra note 9.
11
Id.; Niall McCarthy, U.S. Billionaires Gained $1 Trillion Since the Pandemic
Started, STATISTA (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.statista.com/chart/22068/change-inwealth-of-billionaires-during-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/HEB2-H78W]; Ang, supra
note 9.
12
Stocks Rise on Wall Street as S&P 500 Hits Record High, AP NEWS (Nov. 27,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/seoul-tokyo-hong-kong-shanghai-coronaviruspandemic-eddb4ca8ddaa9fc749a8d83c0aff76b3.
13
John Cassidy, The Great Coronavirus Divide: Wall Street Profits Surge as
Poverty Rises, NEW YORKER (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ourcolumnists/the-great-coronavirus-divide-wall-street-profits-surge-as-poverty-rises
[https://perma.cc/UT5Q-S4AV].
14
Id.
15
Id.
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overlooked in this widely accepted observation: the role that
contracts and contract law play in facilitating this reality and the
profound and often devastating social consequences that contracts
and contract law help produce in this process.
A lot has been said about the roles that contracts and contract
law play in American society.16 But to be very clear upfront, this
Essay is a primer, meaning it is going to be relatively short and
definitely to the point. Part I provides a brief step-by-step analysis
of contract law in action, the practical effect of which is to ensure
that contracting parties who start with more end up with more.
Part I thus shows how contracts and contract law help to create
and perpetuate inequality in American society. Part II explains
why contracts’ and contract law’s roles in producing economic and
social inequality are largely ignored. The short answer is because,
depending on who the adversely-affected contracting party is, a
contract is usually understood as a private transaction between
private parties asserting their private rights. To understand how
you get everyone to buy into the fiction that contracts are usually
private is to understand ideology and how it is reproduced in the
field of contract law. Perhaps counterintuitively, Part II therefore
traces part of contract law’s evolution story to the Emancipation
of the slaves and the Reconstruction that followed. Part III briefly
revisits the housing market crash that precipitated the Great
Recession of 2007-2009 to illustrate the devastating consequences
that contracts and contract law helped produce, and the skewed
response to those consequences that are engendered, at least in
part, because we cling to the fiction that contracts and contract
law have nothing to do with inequality.
Clearly, there are other explanations for the extent and
intransigence of racial inequality in the United States. That said,
we ignore contracts and contract law at our peril, because they
both play an integral part in how inequality is perpetuated in
American society.

16
See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly NonCoercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 475 (1923); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract,
46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 591–92 (1933); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract
Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 829–30 (1983); Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race
and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 897 (1997);
Hila Keren, “We Insist! Freedom Now”: Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything
Constitutional to Say?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 138 (2005); Danielle Kie Hart,
Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 182–83
(2009) [hereinafter, Hart, Formation].
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I. INEQUALITY
Inequality in America starts with property, specifically, what
and how much a person owns.17 Property rights are determined
by the State, which means the State decides what constitutes
property, how it can be acquired and what one can and cannot do
with it.18 The starkest example of the State’s power to determine
what constitutes property is a slave.19 On December 31, 1862, the
day before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, slaves
were property under the laws of the Southern States.20 They could
be made to work, punished, and bought and sold as their owners
saw fit.21 On January 1, 1863, the Emancipation Proclamation

17

See generally Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12–
13 (1927).
18
The vast majority of the land in the United States was originally owned by
American Indian nations. Singer, Property, supra note 1, at 248. That land was taken
from the American Indian nations and given to white settlers. Id. According to Singer,
“under both colonial and U.S. law, title was transferred from the [American Indian]
tribes to the United States government before individual titles could vest. Thus, all
titles to land in the United States have their source in a government grant or
sale . . . .” Id. at 241–42. See also Singer, Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 5; Harris, supra
note 1, at 1719–21; Cohen, supra note 17, at 13–14.
19
Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE
LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY
127, 132–33 (Jean Allain ed., 2012); Harris, supra note 1, at 1720. The North Carolina
Supreme Court held in 1869 that the buying and selling of a slave at auction in North
Carolina in 1864 was a valid and enforceable contract. Harrell v. Watson, 63 N.C. 454,
456–57 (1869). The Court reasoned:
In what point of view can this transaction be considered against public policy,
or as so violating good morals as to authorize a court of justice to refuse to
enforce the contract? As is said Phillips v. Hooker, Phil. Eq. 193 “the
transaction was one in the ordinary course of business, done without any
reference to the operations of the government of the United States, or of the
Confederate States, without any criminal intent to aid the rebellion, and to
hold the contract void, will simply have the effect to encourage dishonesty.”
Id. at 459–60.
20
See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 18 (1998).
21
See id.; Judith K. Schafer, “Details Are of a Most Revolting Character”: Cruelty
to Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1283, 1284 (1993); see also Spencer v. Pilcher, 35 Va. 565, 579, 584 (1837) (contract
between plaintiff and defendant by which defendant hired the plaintiff’s slave for a
year to work on the defendant’s plantation; the slave accidentally drowned when he
was put to work on a boat, instead of the plantation. The court held that the defendant
was liable to the plaintiff for the slave’s loss.); Wilder v. Richardson, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.)
323, 323–24 (Ct. App. Law 1838) (holding that when plaintiff’s slave was hired by
defendant for a year but ran away before the year was up, “[i]t is one of the risks, both
in contracts of purchase and hiring, that the slave may run away, and hence the party
buying or hiring must sustain the loss.”).
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changed the legal status of slaves such that they were no longer
legally considered property and were instead freed persons.22
So, property starts with the State. How the State should
distribute property is a contested question,23 but the reality is that
the State has never distributed property equally.24 In fact, the
State limited the original distribution of property to white
people.25 It should therefore come as no surprise that some people
own more property than others. Consider, for example, the
following: On December 31, 1862, a white plantation owner in the
South owned the land on which his plantation was situated, along
with any buildings, equipment, farm animals located on the
plantation, probably some money from the crops grown on his
plantation, and slaves. A slave owned absolutely nothing. On
January 1, 1863, the white plantation owner still owned
everything that he owned the day before minus his slaves. The
newly-freed slave, however, owned—in the sense of having
autonomy over oneself and no longer being owned by another—
only himself.
Property and contracts have a symbiotic relationship because
a contract is the device we use to transfer property—real and
personal, tangible and intangible—from one party to another. But
in the context of contract law, property also means bargaining
power, because property is the original basis of bargaining
power.26 At its most basic, property as bargaining power works

22
See, e.g., Haden v. Phillips, 21 La. Ann. 517, 518 (1869) (holding that the sale
of a slave after the Emancipation Proclamation was issued “conveyed no title to nor
property in such person, and the payment of the alleged price could not be enforced”)
(citing Posey v. Driggs, 20 La. Ann. 199, 199 (1868)).
23
Compare Harris, supra note 1, at 1715–19, 1721–24 (documenting some of the
ways in which property was racially constructed in the United States to the benefit of
white people), with Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 passim
(1993) (lauding traditional conceptions of property).
24
Cohen, supra note 17, at 12–14.
25
A couple short but powerful examples will suffice to make the point. The State
sanctioned slavery and legally made slaves property. See supra notes 17–20 and
accompanying text. Black people were enslaved, whereas white people were “free” and
could not be enslaved. Consequently, only white people could own slaves. Harris,
supra note 1, at 1720–21. Further, after the United States took all the land from
Native American tribes, it then distributed the land to only white settlers. See id at
1716.
26
Cohen, supra note 17, at 12–13; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 627–28 (1943). Bargaining power still
includes, but is not limited to property—real and persona, tangible and intangible.
Instead, bargaining power is much broader and includes many other things, such as
social, cultural, and embodied capital. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, A Realist View
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like this: One of the main rights associated with property is the
right to exclude or withhold that property from others.27 The right
to withhold thus provides the property owner leverage when
negogiating to force a non-owner to agree to the owner’s terms.28
Consequently, the more property a person owns, the more potent
their right to withhold, and, therefore ability to get his preferred
terms, becomes.29 Consider, again, the white plantation owner
and the newly-freed slave the day after the Emancipation
Proclamation was issued. The plantation owner owned the land,
buildings, equipment, and farm animals on the plantation; the
freedman owned only himself. Unless the freedman had another
source of income, which he would not, he would need to sell his
labor to earn money for, among other things, food and a place to
live. Not so for the plantation owner whose property would enable
him to sustain himself, at least for a while. Under these
circumstances, the freedman would be forced to work for someone,
such as the plantation owner, for whatever the plantation owner
decided to pay him. Failure to agree to the plantation owner’s
terms would result in the plantation owner withholding what he
owned from the freedman and, consequently, the freedman going
without the means to support himself.
The fact that the parties to a contract come to the contract
negotiating table with unequal amounts of property and, hence,
unequal bargaining power, is something that contract law has
recognized for a long time. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court in Coppage v. Kansas acknowledged as much when it wrote
in 1915 that, “unless all things are held in common, some persons
must have more property than others.”30 What someone owns will
therefore determine not only that person’s bargaining power in the
market but also what that person will ultimately be able to
acquire.31

of Bargaining Power, in FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT: THE STORY OF CONTRACT LAW
AND INEQUALITY (on file with author).
27
Singer, Property, supra note 1, at 244; Elizabeth Mensch, The History of
Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 34–
35 (David Kairys 3d ed. 1998).
28
Mensch, supra note 27, at 35.
29
Cohen, supra note 17, at 11–13; Hale, supra note 16, at 471–73; Hale, supra
note 26, at 627; see Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465,
486 (1988).
30
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
31
Cohen, supra note 17, at 13; Hale, supra note 26, at 627–28.

456

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:449

Of course, contract law does not concern itself with every use
of unequal bargaining power that occurs during a contract
transaction. On the contrary, it concerns itself only when the use
of unequal bargaining power amounts to one party taking some
kind of undue advantage of the other party. A good example of
this is when one party uses its unequal bargaining power to
coerce,32 the other party to enter into a contract on unfair terms.33
But even here, the existence of unequal bargaining power would
not present a problem for contract law if these questionable types
of contracts are not generally enforceable. The reality, however,
is that the vast majority of contracts are enforceable under
existing contract law. As a result, all uses of unequal bargaining
power, proper and improper, thereby become entrenched and
protected by the contract law system with far-reaching
consequences for contracting parties and the contract law system
as a whole.34
To begin with, contract law ignores its own structural
inequality, namely, the presence of unequal bargaining power.
This is reflected in the fact that contract law applies the same
rules to everyone no matter who the contracting parties are or
what they bring to the bargaining table with them. In the
abstract, applying the same rules to everyone may not seem
problematic, but the reality is that some rules end up being more
significant in the contracting process and, therefore to the
contracting parties, than others. More specifically, everything in

32
See generally Hart, Formation, supra note 16, at 180–81. “Coerce” as used in
the text refers to using unfair and deceptive tactics or causing or at least taking
advantage of the other party’s financial distress in the context of contract formation.
The specific contract doctrines triggered by these references are unconscionability and
economic duress, respectively. For unconscionability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS. § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—
The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487–88 (1967). For economic
duress, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. § 175 (AM. L. INST. 1981); Selmer
Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
other party must cause the financial hardship); accord N. Fabrication Co. v. UNOCAL,
980 P.2d 958, 962 (Alaska 1999) (per curiam). But see Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton
Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that it is enough that one
party takes advantage of the other side’s financial circumstances). See generally John
P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947)
(discussing the boundaries of common law duress).
33
A contract on “unfair terms” is one in which the terms unreasonably favor one
of the parties. See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. This definition is traditionally the one
used to define substantive unconscionability. See, e.g., id.
34
See Hart, Formation, supra note 16, at 216–17.
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the field of contract law turns on whether a contract is formed,
from how the contract should be interpreted, to whether it was
performed or breached, and deciding the appropriate remedy for
any breach. All of these things are contingent on the existence of
a contract.35
Contract formation, therefore, is the core of the contract law
system.36 Significantly, and from a practical standpoint, formation
is key because at the moment a contract is formed, contract law
will presume that a valid contract exists, and the burden of
rebutting this presumption of contract validity is placed on the
party that wants to challenge the contract or one or more of its
terms.37 That said, applying the same rules to everyone is not
necessarily a problem if it is relatively hard to form a contract to
begin with or relatively easy to get out of a contract once it is
formed—in other words, if it is relatively easy to rebut the
presumption of contract validity. But the reverse is actually
true—it is relatively easy to get into a contract and very difficult
to get out of one.38
It is relatively easy to get into a contract online or in person
because the entire contract law system is premised on the notion
of consent. Parties have to consent, meaning they have to
voluntarily agree, to enter into a contract. If consent does not
exist, there can be no contract.39 So the question really becomes:
how easy is it to consent to a contract?
There are several different theories of consent espoused by
contract scholars, including but not limited to Robert Hillman and
Maureen O’Rourke’s “reasonable notice” theory40 and Karl
35

Id. at 199, 200–02.
Id. at 216.
37
Id. at 206, 211–16.
38
See generally Danielle Kie Hart, In and Out—Contract Doctrines in Action, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 1661 (2015) [hereinafter, Hart, Doctrines].
39
Randy E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise; Contract is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 647, 654 (2012); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 18–20 (2013); Gillian K. Hadfield, An
Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of
Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1247 (1998); Jay M.
Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1286 (1990).
40
The reasonable notice theory argues that it is not necessary to make sure that
people read the terms of the contract before agreeing to the contract as long as people
are given reasonable notice that the exists and an opportunity to read them. If those
two prerequisites are met, then consent can and should be imputed. Tess WilkinsonRyan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1756–
57 (2014); Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software
Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 105–06 (2011).
36
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Llewellyn’s “blanket assent” theory.41 But the most widelyaccepted theory of consent focuses on the parties’ intent to be
bound.42 This test simply looks to a party’s words and conduct to
see if those words and conduct manifested an intent to be bound
to a contract and, if so, asks if that party intended to say those
words or engage in those actions. If she did, for example, by
clicking “I agree” on a website, then that party’s consent to the
agreement will be legally established, even if she did not actually
intend to enter into a contract or understand the legal
consequences of her actions.43 Regardless of which theory of
consent is used, the one thing they have in common is that they all
end up concluding that valid consent exists. In other words, each
theory finds a way to explain and justify why consent is present in
just about every conceivable contracting situation.44 What this
means is that it is quite easy to consent, or be deemed to have
consented, to a contract. Stated another way, it is fairly easy to
get into, or to form, a contract.45
Coupled with the fact that it is relatively easy to enter into a
contract is the reality that it is very difficult to rebut the
presumption of contract validity in practice.
It is widely
understood in the field of contract law that courts rarely let parties
out of their contracts.46 This is true regardless of the legal excuse
being advanced, including situations in which one of the
contracting parties is accused of improperly using its unequal

41
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960). Llewellyn argued that parties assenting to terms in a standard form contract
should be deemed to specifically assent to any terms that were actually negotiated
and as giving their “blanket assent” to any other terms in the form that were “not
unreasonable or indecent.” Hart, Formation, supra note 16, at 209; Wilkinson-Ryan,
supra note 40, at 1756–57.
42
See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 40, at 1757; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 3.01, 3.06–3.07 (4th ed. 2019); JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 30–31 (5th ed. 2011); JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (6th ed. 2009). See also Joseph M. Perillo,
The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 446–63 (2000).
43
Hart, Formation, supra note 16, at 209; FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, at § 3.06;
MURRAY, supra note 42, at § 31; PERILLO, supra note 42, at § 2.4.
44
Hart, Formation, supra note 16, at 206–10; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 40, at
1756-58.
45
See RADIN, supra note 39, at 10–13.
46
See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43
STAN. L. REV. 99, 99 (1990) (“Notwithstanding academic writing that reports or urges
expansion of the grounds of excuse, courts actually remain extremely reluctant to
release parties from their obligations.”) (footnote omitted).
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bargaining power to take undue advantage of the other party.47
The conventional wisdom that it is extremely difficult to get out of
a contract has been substantiated by empirical scholarship
specifically examining doctrines like duress,48 unconscionability,49
contract modifications,50 impossibility, impracticability of
performance, and frustration of purpose.51
Five important implications thus flow from the fact that the
presumption of contract validity is difficult to rebut in practice.
First, because legal excuses like those mentioned above do not get
people out of their contracts very often, this must mean that even
though unequal bargaining power exists, it is not a problem in a
majority of contracts. This must be the case because, surely, if
unequal bargaining power was being misused, courts would have
discovered it and done something about it, such as let the party
adversely affected by the improper use of bargaining power out of
the contract. But based on the empirical research, courts do not
actually let contracting parties out of their contracts very often,
regardless of the legal excuse being raised.52 Second, if unequal
bargaining power is not being misused in most contracts, then it
must be safe to conclude that most contracts are in fact the product
of consent, notwithstanding the presence of any unequal
bargaining power. Third, and practically speaking, since most
47

See id.; E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980’s:
The Top Ten, 41 CASE W RES. L. REV. 203, 225 (1990) (discussing unconscionability);
Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory:
An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 110 (1998) (noting that there is a
dearth of cases excusing performance for duress, unconscionability and undue
influence); Michael G. Rapsomanikas, Frustration of Contract in International Trade
Law and Comparative Law, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 551, 558–59 (1980) (discussing that
impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose does not generally excuse
performance).
48
See Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107
W. VA. L. REV. 443, 463–65 (2005); Hart, Doctrines, supra note 38, at 1672–73.
49
See generally Brian M. McCall, Demystifying Unconscionability: A Historical
and Empirical Analysis, 65 VILL. L. REV. 773, 789–92, 794 (2020) (Professor McCall
conducted his own empirical study of unconscionability and summarized other
existing empirical studies covering the same doctrine).
50
See Hart, Doctrines, supra note 38, at 1672–73.
51
See generally Danielle Kie Hart, If Past is Prologue, Then the Future is Bleak:
Contracts, COVID-19 and the Changed Circumstances Doctrines (Sw. L. Sch. Res.
Paper No. 21-01), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3785621 (Feb.
14, 2021) (empirical study examining impossibility, impracticability of performance
and frustration of purpose); see also Arthur Anderson, Frustration of Contract—A
Rejected Doctrine, 3 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 21–22 (1953) (analyzing frustration of purpose
cases).
52
See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 46, at 99; Giesel, supra note 48, at 463–66; McCall,
supra note 49; Hart, supra note 51; Anderson, supra note 51.
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contracts are the product of consent, most people should not be
able to get out of them. In the parlance of contract law, this means
that most contracts should be and will be binding.53 Fourth,
because most contracts will be binding, how a contract is formed
and the terms that are included in it are critical. This is because,
fifth and finally, the State will enforce these contracts.54
The practical effect of all of this is that the party that starts
out with more will end up with more. Recall that what a party
owns—its property rights—determines that party’s bargaining
power in the market.55 Unsurprisingly, the party with more
bargaining power will get to dictate the terms of the contract,
which means that the party with more bargaining power will be
able to reap more gains from each contract that it enters into than
it otherwise would with less bargaining power at its disposal.
Making contracts binding and enforceable thus ensures that the
party with more bargaining power gets to keep the gains from each
of its contracts. Over time, the party with more bargaining power
will end up owning more—more land, money, labor, and other
resources, both tangible and intangible. The more one party owns
the more bargaining power that party has ad infinitum.56 In short,
the Haves come out ahead. Schematically, this re-instantiation of
the pre-existing and intersecting hierarchies of race and class (rich
whites) (the Haves) over poor people of color (the Have Nots) in the
field of contract law might look like this:

53

See Hart, Formation, supra note 16, at 216.
Id. at 216.
55
See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
56
See Hart, Formation, supra note 16, at 190 n.82; Betty Mensch, Book Review,
Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 764 (1981).
54

2021]

CONTRACT LAW & RACIAL INEQUALITY

461

To make this entire discussion more concrete, consider the
following contract case. McCook v. Cousins was decided just eight
years after President Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation in 1861 and four years after the Civil War ended in
1865.57 McCook, a landowner, sold all of the cotton that was
harvested on his land for $841.21.58 Edmund, whose last name
was never provided in the opinion, was a recently emancipated
slave who contracted with McCook to work McCook’s land in
exchange for half of the proceeds of the cotton produced.59
Edmund, however, was only entitled to $210, having agreed to
split his half with another party.60 But McCook proved that
Edmund owed him $571 for the provisions provided to him and his
family.61 After fully performing the contract, therefore, Edmund
owed his contracting partner McCook, the landowner, $361.62 The
landowner, on the other hand, remained the owner of his land,
ended up with his and Edmund’s share of the crops, and now
owned the amount of Edmund’s remaining debt.63
II. IDEOLOGY
Right/wrong. Fair/unfair. Efficient/inefficient. Everyone is
certainly entitled to their own opinion about the outcome in the
McCook v. Cousins case. Nonetheless, contracts and contract law
in action help create and perpetuate inequality in American
society.64 Even so, their roles will for the most part go unnoticed
because, depending on who the adversely affected contracting
party is, a contract is usually understood as a private transaction
voluntarily entered into by private parties.65 As such, any
inequality that might be produced as a result of these private
transactions is simply a by-product of the parties’ exercise of their
private rights. To convince everyone to internalize the message

57

39 Ga. 125 (1869).
Id. at 126–27
59
Id. at 125–26.
60
Id. at 126–27.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 129.
64
See, e.g., Deborah Zalesne, Racial Inequality in Contracting: Teaching Race as
a Core Value, 3 COLUM. J. OF RACE & L. 23, 37 (2013) (demonstrating how contract
law may perpetuate racial inequality).
65
Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 59 (2012).
58
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that contracts and their consequences are private matters requires
transforming the ideological content of the message into taken-forgranted assumptions about the way the world works;66 and this
transformative process is facilitated through discourse.
First, a brief word about ideology. Ideology can be defined as
a coherent “system of beliefs, values, fears, prejudices, reflexes,
and commitments.”67 Ideology is often associated with Marxism
and invokes the idea that the way we know and understand the
world is determined by political interests, which is often conflated
with a ruling class.68 But ideology is no longer limited to this topdown approach. Instead, ideology is something that we acquire
through discourse and everyday institutional norms and
practices.69 This is because ideology cannot be imposed by
material strength, like violence and the use of force, alone.
Instead, ideology must be represented to everyone in ways that
make the ideas seem natural and inevitable, that is, to make them
“fit the everyday experience[s]” of everyday people.70 Ideology, in
other words, is a subtle form of power because its success depends
on the widespread consent of the people to whom it is directed.71
The reproduction of ideology through discourse is a complex
and contested process well beyond the scope of this Article.72 But
66
Antonio Gramsci, Italian theorist and cofounder of the Italian communist
party, called these taken-for-granted assumptions “common sense.” KATE CREHAN,
GRAMSCI’S COMMON SENSE: INEQUALITY AND ITS NARRATIVES x (2016). According to
anthropologist Kate Crehan, “common sense” to Gramsci was “all those heterogeneous
beliefs people arrive at not through critical reflection, but encounter as already
existing, self-evident truths.” Id. Gramsci’s “common sense” is similar to what French
anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu called “doxa,” which are unstated but fundamental
beliefs that everyone accepts as a given. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY
OF PRACTICE 159–71 (Richard Nice trans. 1977).
67
ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 4 (1995); see ANDREW EDGAR & PETER
SEDGWICK, CULTURAL THEORY: THE KEY CONCEPTS 171 (2d ed. 2008) (“Its most
common use may be simply to refer to a more or less coherent set of beliefs (such as a
political ideology, meaning the beliefs, values and basic principles of a political party
or faction).”).
68
EDGAR & SEDGWICK, supra note 67, at 172.
69
Id. at 173 (discussing Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony which posits that
control by the dominant group in society must be premised on consent.); see also Emily
M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the
Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1056–57 nn.167–
68 (2003) (citations omitted).
70
EDGAR & SEDGWICK, supra note 67, at 155.
71
Id. at 173, 223, 232; Houh, supra note 69, at 1056–57 n.168; STEVE JONES,
ANTONIO GRAMSCI 3–4 (2006).
72
Compare BOURDIEU, supra note 66, and CREHAN, supra note 66 (discussing
Gramsci), with MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE
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in keeping with the premise of a primer, the basic ideas can be
summarized as follows: For the social world to work, where “work”
simply means to exist in some predictable fashion, there has to be
some basic understanding and acceptance between members
about how that world is set up and the rules that govern all of the
interactions that take place therein.73 These rules can be
explicit—for example, a red light means that cars must stop at the
intersection—or they can be implicit—for example, cutting in line
is usually considered improper behavior. One of the ways that the
members of a social world are taught and thereby learn the rules
of the game is through discourse.74 Discourse is “the production of
knowledge through language”75 that occurs in social contexts and
social institutions,76 like the family, education, law, politics, and
religion.77 Discourse is an active process, the purpose of which is
to fashion specific and ultimately shared understandings of the
world that not only legitimatize the meanings proffered but also
the responses to those meanings.78 To the extent that the rules
that everyone ends up internalizing reproduce hierarchy by
ensuring that the Haves of the world come out ahead and stay that
way, the rules are ideological.79 In short, how something ends up
DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE 4–6 (A.M. Sheridan Smith transl. 1972). For a brief
explanation of Bourdieu’s theory of reproduction in the social world, see Danielle Kie
Hart, Cross-Purposes & Unintended Consequences: Karl Llewellyn, Article 2, and the
Limits of Social Transformation, 12 NEV. L.J. 54, 72–78 (2011) [hereinafter, Hart,
Llewellyn]. Ideology itself is a highly contested term. See, e.g., John Gerring, Field
Essay, Ideology: A Definitional Analysis, 50 POL. RSCH. Q. 957, 957–59 (1997) (“Few
concepts in the social science lexicon have occasioned so much discussion, so much
disagreement, and so much self[-]conscious discussion of the disagreement, as
‘ideology.’ ”).
73
See, e.g., BOURDIEU, supra note 66; CREHAN, supra note 66 (discussing
Gramsci). For a brief explanation of Bourdieu’s theory of reproduction in the social
world, see Hart, Llewellyn, supra note 72, at 72–78.
74
See Hila Keren, Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional
Consequences of the Arbitration Revolution, 72 FLA. L. REV. 575, 605 (2020).
75
REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES
44 (Stuart Hall ed., 2009) [hereinafter REPRESENTATION].
76
Social institutions are defined by contemporary sociologists as “complex social
forms that reproduce themselves such as governments, the family . . . hospitals,
business corporations, and legal systems.” Seumas Miller, Social Institutions, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/
encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=social-institutions [https://perma.cc/3JCX-7M2G].
77
See, e.g., EDGAR & SEDGWICK, supra note 67, at 80; REPRESENTATION, supra
note 75, at 47.
78
See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 72. For abbreviated but very helpful
discussions of discourse, see REPRESENTATION, supra note 75, at 41–43; EDGAR &
SEDGWICK, supra note 67, at 172.
79
For example, Andrew Edgar and Peter Sedgwick write that:
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getting discussed is key, because these discussions, this discourse,
help define our shared reality.
Emancipation was not only a critical moment in the history of
this country, it was also a moment that cemented the role that
contracts and contract law would play in shaping society.80 What
did a country owe to the people it had enslaved for centuries?81 So
much was theoretically possible and morally required to try at a
minimum to repair some of the damage and suffering inflicted
upon the emancipated slaves during and because of their
subjugation. According to Priya Kandaswamy, “freed people held
broad and diverse visions of freedom that included reparations,
land ownership, freedom of mobility, and other self-defined
mechanisms of individual and collective self-determination.”82
Unfortunately, nothing of long-lasting consequence was done
to alleviate the material devastation wrought by slavery.83
Marx’s approach to ideology may be introduced through the famous
observation that, for any society, the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling
ideas. This is to suggest that our understanding and knowledge of the world
(and especially, if not exclusively, of the social world) is determined by
political interests. There are certain beliefs, and certain ways of seeing the
world, that will be in the interests of the dominant class (but not in the
interests of subordinate classes).
EDGAR & SEDGWICK, supra note 67, at 172. For Antonio Gramsci, the Haves were the
dominant social group, see JONES, supra note 71, at 3–4. For Bourdieu, the Haves
would be the dominant group with the most capital, see Hart, Llewellyn, supra note
72, at 74–75.
80
See SAIDIYA HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELFMAKING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 171 (1997) (“[I]t is equally important to
consider the dominance of particular interpretations and assessments of the law—
that is, the partial fixation of meaning at decisive ‘nodal points.’ ”).
81
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877, at 115 (1988). Though contested, many people trace the starting point of
slavery in America to the year 1619 when twenty enslaved Africans were brought to
Jamestown, Virginia, which was then a British colony. See Slavery in America,
HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/slavery [https://perma.cc/
2K7G-AXAH] (last updated Aug. 23, 2021); but see, E.R. Shipp, 1619: 400 Years Ago,
A Ship Arrived in Virginia, Bearing Human Cargo, USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2019, 6:11
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/02/08/
1619-african-arrival-virginia/2740468002/ [https://perma.cc/FJU4-E5TX]. President
Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Slavery
in America, supra.
82
Priya Kandaswamy, The Obligations of Freedom and the Limits of Legal
Equality, 41 SW. L. REV. 265, 266 (2012) (citations omitted).
83
The Reconstruction Congress passed the Freedmen’s Bureau Act on March 3,
1865. Freedman’s Bureau Act, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507–09 (1865). The Act created the
Freedmen’s Bureau, which was charged with establishing schools for the recently
emancipated slaves, supervising contracts between freedmen and employers, and
managing land that had been confiscated or abandoned. Id. But the Freedmen’s
Bureau was only authorized to operate “during the [American Civil War]of rebellion,
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Instead, the country settled on formal equality as the full measure
of its obligation to the newly freed slaves.84 Parts of the
Reconstruction Amendments thus provide:85
• Thirteenth Amendment: Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime . . . shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.86
• Fourteenth Amendment: All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States . . . . No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
and for one year thereafter.” Freedman’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/FreedmensBureau.ht
m#:~:text=On%20March%203%2C%201865%2C%20Congress,including%20newly%2
0freed%20African%20Americans. The work of the Freedmen’s Bureau was eventually
extended but only for an additional two years beyond the original timeframe. Id.
84
HARTMAN, supra note 80, at 176. Notwithstanding the abstract nature of the
rights conferred on the emancipated slaves, it goes without saying that the
Reconstruction Amendments and early Civil Rights Acts were profoundly important
and necessary to, among other things, legally abolish slavery and explicitly recognize
the political and civil rights to which the freed people were now legally entitled.
Formal equality and the emphasis on legal rights during and ever since
Reconstruction embodies both critique and aspiration. The critique is that legal rights
simply mask and therefore legitimize the way the world is by stamping the
imprimatur of law on it. See KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
THE KEY WRITINGS xxiii (1995). But rights also have the potential to transform and
empower people and social movements. Id.; see also HARTMAN, supra note 80, at 122–
23.
85
This commitment to formal equality was mirrored in the 1866 and 1875 Civil
Rights Acts. They provide in relevant part:
1866 Civil Rights Act: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That all persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude
. . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States . . . .
1866 Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
1875 Civil Rights Act: An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and Legal
Rights. Whereas, it is essential to just government we recognize the equality
of all men before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its
dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of
whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or political; and it
being the appropriate object of legislation to enact great fundamental
principles into law . . . .
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
86
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.87
• Fifteenth Amendment: The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.88

To be sure, different interpretations of “equality” animated
the debates during Emancipation and Reconstruction that
followed. The abolitionists advocated for an expansive view of
equality, one that would redress the effects of racial oppression.89
In contrast, pro-slavery opponents argued for a much more
restrictive interpretation of equality, one that focused on equality
as a process not equality in results.90 That said, Emancipation and
87

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
89
Senator James Harlan [R. Iowa] stated in the Senate Debates on the Thirteenth
Amendment that:
If I am right in my conclusions that slavery as it exists in this country cannot
be justified by human reason, has no foundation at common law, and is not
supported by the positive municipal laws of the States, nor by the divine law,
and that none of its incidents [specifically discussing as “incidents” the right
to marry, parental rights, the right to bring a suit in court] are desirable,
and that its abolition would injure no one, and will do no wrong, but will
secure unity of purpose . . . as it seems to me, the Senate of the United States
ought not to hesitate to take the action necessary to enable the people of the
States to terminate its existence forever . . . .
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS PART I at 72-75 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1970) (Senate Debate—Thirteenth Amendment; remarks of Senator
Hames Harlan [R. Iowa]); id. at 131 (House Debate—Civil Rights Act of 1866; remarks
of Representative Martin Thayer [R., PA]) (“I thought when I voted for the amendment
to abolish slavery that I was aiding to give real freedom to the men who had so long
been groaning in bondage. I did not suppose that I was offering them a mere paper
guarantee.”) But historian Eric Foner argues that moral opposition to slavery was
only one aspect of the Republican Party’s ideology before and after Emancipation and
that the “primary aim of the [Republicans] was not to redistribute the property of the
rich, but to open the avenues of social advancement to all laborers.” FONER, supra
note 67, at 5, 19. In fact, Republicans did not differ much from their Democratic
counterparts in terms of their positions on property rights and economic
individualism. Id. at 19. Republicans in the North and West also shared something
else in common with Democrats in the South, namely, racism. Racial prejudice was
also rampant and “all but universal in antebellum northern society.” Id. at 261.
90
For example, during the House Debate on the 1875 Civil Rights Act,
Representative Charles Eldredge stated:
The law has done all it can accomplish for them. So far as the law is
concerned, the black man is in all respects the equal of the white. He stands
and may make the race of life upon terms of perfect equality with the most
88
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the Reconstruction that followed it were firmly situated in and
framed by the tenets of classical liberalism, which essentially
equated liberty with property rights and relied on the market to
preserve and protect freedom.91 Under classical liberalism,
therefore, the quintessential liberal subject was an owner; and the
most basic proprietary right of each truly free person was the right
to own oneself and one’s labor.92 The State’s main duties were to
establish laws to protect private property that would apply to
everyone equally and to enforce the law.93 As a result, the rhetoric
used during the debates over the Reconstruction Amendments and
early Civil Rights Acts, that is, how equality was discussed,
reflects the classical liberal understanding of the world. While it
was not clear from the debates which approach to equality would
prevail in the long run, the Supreme Court quickly determined
that equality would be limited to formal equality going forward.94

favored citizen. There is no right, privilege, or immunity secured to any
citizen of the Republic that is not confirmed to the colored. There is no court,
no tribunal, no judicial jurisdiction, no remedy, no means of any sort in the
land, provided by law for the redress of wrongs or the protection of the rights
of life, liberty, or property of the white man that is not equally open and
available to the black man. The broad panoply of the Constitution and the
whole body of laws, civil and criminal, and every means provided for their
enforcement, cover and extend to every American citizen without regard to
color or previous condition . . . . There is no distinction, no exception, no
immunity in favor of the white race.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 737 (House Debate—Civil Rights Act of 1875; remarks
of Representative Charles Eldredge [Dem., Wis.]) (emphasis omitted); cf. Houh, supra
note 69, at 1061 (discussing the expansive and restrictive views of equality).
91
See Gerald Gaus, Shane D. Courtland & David Schmidtz, Liberalism, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/
[https://perma.cc/AY5V-RT95]; Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal
Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 417–18 (2012).
92
DRU STANLEY, supra note 20, at 8; Desautels-Stein, supra note 91, at 413–14.
93
Desaultels-Stein, supra note 91, at 417–20.
94
See The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72–76 (1873) (interpreting the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that the
states were only prohibited from abridging those privileges or immunities granted to
citizens of the United States by the federal government itself; thus, rights that exist
or existed separate and apart from the federal government, like life and property, were
still left to state control); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4, 10–12, 25 (1881)
(interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in
places of public accommodation. The Act was based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which granted Congress authority to enact legislation to effectuate the
provisions of the Amendment. The Court held that the enforcement section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, like its substantive provisions, was limited to state action
only. Consequently, Congress could not, through the 1875 Act, reach purely private
discriminatory conduct.).
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Consequently, the congressional debates surrounding the
passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the early Civil Rights
Acts, and the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts provide the most revealing
indication of how the people who were responsible for
Reconstruction after the American Civil War understood what was
being granted to the emancipated slaves.95 The commitment to
formal equality as the sum total of what was required of the
federal government in response to the gross injustice of slavery
was grounded in the conception people had about the role that
government was supposed to play in society. According to
Representative Fernando Wood, a Democratic Representative
from New York who opposed Reconstruction, the proper role of
government was to simply protect the individual in his pursuit and
enjoyment of “life and liberty, and in the exercise of his faculties
for labor, physical and mental, [and] in the acquisition and
preservation of property.”96 Hence, all that the government
needed to do was to secure equal rights under the law for all
citizens, which is exactly what was done.97
The debates thus make clear that all of the rights being
enacted during Reconstruction applied equally to everyone. The
remarks of Senator Jacob Howard, the Republican Senator from
Michigan who presented the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Senate, are illustrative. He said:
[I]f [the Fourteenth Amendment is] adopted by the States, [it
will] forever disable every one of them from passing laws
trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which
pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who
may happen to be within their jurisdiction. It establishes equality
before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most
despised of the race the same rights and the same protection

95

FONER, supra note 67, at 7 (“In all the slavery debates . . . I have spoken to the
people rather than [to] the Senate.” Foner concludes, however, that to remain effective
leaders, the views of politicians “could not diverge too sharply from those of the
general public.”) (quoting Senator William Seward); id. at 8 (“It is, no doubt, safe to
assume that the Republican ideology received its most coherent expression from the
political leaders [in their] speeches, letters, and writings . . . .”).
96
SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 44–45 (House Debate—Thirteenth Amendment,
remarks of Fernando Wood [Dem. N.Y.]).
97
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, for example, provided that every citizen of the
United States “shall have the same right, . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property . . . .” 1866 Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy,
or the most haughty.98

That said, the commitment to formal equality adopted by the
Reconstruction Congress only made sense because the people in
the Reconstruction Congress held key misconceptions about the
world in general and the people in it. More specifically, elected
officials erroneously assumed that, once they obtained freedom
and were granted the same rights as all other citizens of the
country, the newly-freed slaves should take care of themselves. In
his veto message to Congress of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, for
example, President Andrew Johnson, who was a fierce opponent of
Reconstruction, said that, “[t]he idea on which the slaves were
assisted to freedom was, that on becoming free they would be a
self-sustaining population.”99 According to President Johnson:
98

SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 262 (emphasis added). See also id. at 693–94
(remarks of Senator Henry Pease, a Republican from Mississippi, during the debate
of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, stating, “I believe that the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution clearly indicates that it was the policy of this Government to protect by
all needful legislation every citizen, high or low, rich or poor, white or black, native or
foreign, who should comply with the terms of citizenship; that all classes should have
the equal protection of American law and be protected in their inalienable rights,
those rights which grow out of the very nature of society, and the organic law of this
country. . . . The American people are disposed to establish justice and the equality of
the citizen before the law.”); id. at 715 (remarks of Senator Aaron Sargent, a
Republican from California, during the debate of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, stating,
“[t]he [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was not intended merely to say that black men
should have rights, but that black and white men and women should have rights. It
was a guarantee of equality of right to every person within the jurisdiction of the
United States, be he black or white.”); id. at 737 (Remarks of Representative Charles
Eldredge, a Democrat from Wisconsin, in the House debate on the 1875 Civil Rights
Act, stating, “[t]he broad panoply of the Constitution and the whole body of laws, civil
and criminal, and every means provided for their enforcement, cover and extend to
every American citizen without regard to color or previous condition.”); id. at 743
(remarks of Representative Benjamin Butler, a Republican from Massachusetts and
former Union Army General, in the House debate on the 1875 Civil Rights Act,
stating, “this bill is the very essence of constitutional liberty. What does it do? It
simply provides that there shall be equality of law all over the Union.”).
99
Andrew Johnson, Veto Message of February 19, 1866, U. CAL. SANTA BARBARA:
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/vetomessage-437 [https://perma.cc/PX5J-3WES] (last visited Feb. 20, 2021). An important
corollary to the argument that the recently emancipated slaves were capable of taking
care of themselves was the argument that cast the Civil Rights Acts, for example, as
“special rights” for the freed people. More specifically, the argument essentially
challenged the former slaves to prove that they were worthy of their freedom. After
all, truly free people, truly capable and responsible people would not need “special
rights” to protect them. Referring to the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, President Andrew
Johnson thus said, “Any legislation that shall imply that [the freed people] are not
expected to attain a self-sustaining condition must have a tendency injurious alike to
their character and their prospects.” Id.; accord SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 737–38
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[S]ufficient consideration [has not been] given to the ability of the
freedmen to protect and take care of themselves. It is no more
than justice to them to believe that as they have received their
freedom with moderation and forbearance, so they will
distinguish themselves by their industry and thrift, and soon
show the world that in a condition of freedom they are selfsustaining, capable of selecting their own employment and their
own places of abode, of insisting for themselves on a proper
remuneration, and of establishing and maintaining their own
asylums and schools. It is earnestly hoped that instead of
wasting away they will by their own efforts establish for
themselves a condition of respectability and prosperity. It is
certain that they can attain to that condition only through their
own merits and exertions.100

These same elected officials could only assume that the freed
slaves should take care of themselves without any material
(remarks of Representative Charles Eldredge, a Democrat from Wisconsin, in the
house debate for the 1875 Civil Rights Act that, “[t]o make the colored citizen feel that
he is the pet, the especial favorite of the law, will only feed and pander to that conceit
and self-consequence which is now his weakest and perhaps most offensive
characteristic. If he be made to feel that extraordinary provisions of law are enacted
in his favor because of his weakness or feebleness as a man, the very fact weakens
and enfeebles him. The consciousness that there is necessity for such legislation and
protection must necessarily humiliate and degrade him. Such laws, too, are a constant
reminder to him that he is inferior to the white race.”); see also id. at 154 (President
Andrew Johnson’s Veto Message to Congress of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; Johnson
said, “[i]n all our history, in all our experience as a people living under Federal and
State law, no such system as that contemplated by the details of this bill has ever
before been proposed or adopted. They establish for the security of the colored race
safeguards which go infinitely beyond any that the General Government has ever
provided for the white race.”); HARTMAN, supra note 80, at 133, 175–78; DRU STANLEY,
supra note 20, at 36.
100
Andrew Johnson, Veto Message of February 19, 1866, U. CAL. SANTA BARBARA:
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/vetomessage-437 [https://perma.cc/2SVF-RC6Q] (last visited Feb. 20, 2021); In President
Andrew Johnson’s Veto of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, he stated:
To me the details of the bill seem fraught with evil. The white race and the
black race of the South have hitherto lived together under the relation of
master and slave capital owning labor. Now, suddenly, that relation is
changed, and as to ownership capital and labor are divorced. They stand now
each master of itself . . . . Each has equal power in settling the terms, and if
left to the laws that regulate capital and labor it is confidently believed that
they will satisfactorily work out the problem. Capital, it is true, has more
intelligence, but labor is never so ignorant as not to understand its own
interests, not to know its own value, and not to see that capital must pay
that value.
Andrew Johnson, Veto Message on Civil Rights Legislation, MILLER CENTER,
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-27-1866-vetomessage-civil-rights-legislation [https://perma.cc/SL88-8WAJ] (emphasis added) (last
visited Feb. 20, 2021).
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assistance from the State, because they also speciously assumed
that formal equality established enough equality to enable the
freed slaves to successfully negotiate their post-Emancipation
lives and that market forces would ensure fair outcomes.101 Again,
President Johnson’s veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act illustrates
this point perfectly when he said:
[The freedman’s] condition is not so exposed as may at first be
imagined. He is in a portion of the country where his labor cannot
well be spared. Competition for his services from planters, from
those who are constructing or repairing railroads, or from
capitalists in his vicinage, or from other States, will enable him
to command almost his own terms. He also possesses a perfect
right to change his place of abode, and if, therefore, he does not
find in one community or State a mode of life suited to his desires,
or proper remuneration for his labor, he can move to another
where labor is more esteemed and better rewarded . . . . The laws
that regulate supply and demand will maintain their force, and
the wages of the laborer will be regulated thereby. There is no
danger that the great demand for labor will not operate in favor
of the laborer.102

That there was not actual equality between the former
masters and former slaves was certainly acknowledged. But that
disparity was of no moment. This is because former masters and
former slaves not only had a vested interest in sorting things out
to their mutual benefit, they were also equally equipped to set the
terms of their engagements going forward. Here again, market
forces, not the State, would guarantee that these engagements
would be satisfactory to both parties. In his veto message to
Congress of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, President Andrew Johnson
explained the situation as follows:
The white race and the black race of the South have hitherto lived
together under the relation of master and slave—capital owning
labor. Now that relation is changed; and as to ownership, capital
and labor are divorced. They stand now, each master of itself. In
this new relation, one being necessary to the other, there will be
a new adjustment, which both are deeply interested in making
harmonious. Each has equal power in settling the terms; and, if
left to the laws that regulate capital and labor, it is confidently

101

See FONER, supra note 67, at 40 (discussing the Republican party’s free labor
ideology as one of the forces that drove the Civil War and Emancipation).
102
President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill (Feb. 19,
1866), reprinted in LILLIAN FOSTER, ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, HIS LIFE AND SPEECHES 235–36 (1866).
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believed that they will satisfactorily work out the problem.
Capital, it is true, has more intelligence; but labor is never so
ignorant as not to understand its own interests, not to know its
own value, and not to see that capital must pay that value.103

This, then, was the understanding of the world and how it was
supposed to work that was reproduced during Emancipation and
Reconstruction: “Freedom” as “formal equality” under
Emancipation and through Reconstruction “entailed a movement
from subjugation to self-possession”104 for the newly freed slaves
with all of the same rights to acquire property and the right to
contract enjoyed by white people but without any resources to
sustain themselves in the process.105 This meant that the ravages
created by slavery were simply obstacles that the emancipated
slaves had to overcome through their own efforts, self-discipline,
and the prudent exercise of the rights they were just granted.
Henceforth, freedom and the quality of life produced thereby was
to be determined solely by the efforts of the freed persons
themselves.106
By shifting the responsibility for freedom onto the backs of the
recently emancipated slaves, the State absolved itself of any
responsibility for the horrors and devastation produced by slavery
and the actual inequality that existed between the parties because
of it. This shift also obscured the principal role the State had
played in creating the inequality that actually existed through its
centuries long sanctioning of the institution of slavery.107
Significantly, because success and failure going forward were to be
determined entirely by individual effort, specifically how well
freed persons navigated the ostensibly free market and sold their
labor, the State could not be held responsible for the outcomes of
these essentially private market transactions between private
citizens or for the distribution of wealth and power that resulted
from them. In other words, any inequality resulting from these

103

President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Rights Bill (Mar. 27, 1866),
reprinted in FOSTER, supra note 102, at 277–78. The belief that capital and labor were
equal and mutually dependent was not limited to those who opposed Reconstruction
but was instead held by Republicans and Democrats alike. See FONER, supra note 67,
at 19.
104
HARTMAN, supra note 80, at 132.
105
Saidiya Hartman calls this “the double bind of freedom: being freed from
slavery and free of resources . . . .” Id. at 117.
106
Id. at 129–30, 132–33; see also DRU STANLEY, supra note 20, at 36–37; FONER,
supra note 67, at 261.
107
HARTMAN, supra note 80, at 118, 132.
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transactions going forward had nothing to do with the inequality
that existed at the end of slavery.
Transactions were thus “private” both because the parties to
it were explicitly and intentionally cast as private actors
exercising their private rights and because a powerful narrative
was crafted that explicitly portrayed the State as outside of these
transactions and as having absolutely nothing to do with them.
Because inequality existed and was going to persist into the
future, it too could now be framed as simply the result of private
parties pursuing their own private interests in private
transactions through the exercise of their equal private rights.
Equal rights, personal responsibility, individual effort and
decision-making thus became the keys to success or failure.
This understanding of the world and how it was supposed to
work has been reproduced through contracts and contract law ever
since.108 This is because contracts in the age of Emancipation
became synonymous with freedom and individual responsibility.109
What were otherwise “abstract rights of freedom” granted to the
emancipated slaves became concrete in contracts of wage labor
where the exchange required in every contract “established the
symmetry of the relation, entailing reciprocity of rights and duties
while also testifying to the mutual assent of the contracting
parties.”110 The role of contracts and contract law, therefore, was
to help impose social discipline, which was defined as taking
responsibility for oneself, on the newly freed slaves, everyone
already in the country, and anyone who later flocked to its
shores.111 After all, contracts could only effectively serve this
disciplinary function if most of them end up being enforced, that
is, through the practice of contract law in court. A couple cases
illustrate the extent to which the understanding of the world
following Emancipation and Reconstruction have been reproduced
widely with respect to everyone and consistently over time.

108
The political philosophy that frames the social world and, therefore, contract
law has shifted from classical liberalism to modern liberalism to neoliberalism. But
the basic commitment that contracts and contract law are always and only private
has never wavered. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal
Fictions, 41 U BALT. L. REV. 1, 10, 12 (2011) [hereinafter Hart, Contract Law Now].
109
DRU STANLEY, supra note 20, at 35–37; HARTMAN, supra note 80, at 125, 132–
34.
110
DRU STANLEY, supra note 20, at x, 2.
111
Id. at 1–2, 12–14, 35–37; Kandaswamy, supra note 82, at 267–68 (citations
omitted); P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 654–55 (1979).
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In Coppage v. Kansas, the United States Supreme Court
struck down a Kansas statute that made it unlawful for employers
to require their employees to sign a contract provision promising
not to join a union.112 According to the Court, the employer and
employee who was refusing to sign the contract were equals in that
each possessed the same rights, specifically, the right to liberty,
private property, and to contract, and the equal right to assert
those rights.113 Thus, Justice Pitney, writing for the majority
declared that,
[i]ncluded in the right of personal liberty and the right of private
property—partaking of the nature of each—is the right to make
contracts for the acquisition of property. . . . The right is as
essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the
rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to
begin to aquire property, save by working for money.114

Consequently, and specifically because the parties were
equals, the Court had no trouble concluding that the employee in
Coppage was perfectly capable of taking care of himself in the
market.115 While the Court acknowledged that the employee stood
to gain monetarily in the form of a $1,500 insurance benefit if he
were permitted to join the union, Justice Pitney dismissed the
implication that the employment contract, which required the
employee to forego this benefit, amounted to any kind of coercion.
He wrote, “aside from this matter of pecuniary interest, there is
nothing to show that [the employee] was subjected to the least
pressure or influence, or that he was not a free agent, in all
respects competent, and at liberty to choose what was best from
the standpoint of his own interests.”116 The employee was,
therefore, free to exercise his right to refuse to sign a contract
provision prohibiting him from joining a union and the employer
was equally free to exercise its right to terminate the employee for
his refusal.117 The Court thus concluded that, “any legislation that
disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty
of contract, which no government can legally justify in a free
112

236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915).
Id. at 23–24 (“[T]he rights of the employer and employee are equal.”).
114
Id. at 14.
115
Id. at 21 (“To ask a man to agree, in advance, to refrain from affiliation with
the union while retaining a certain position of employment, is not to ask him to give
up any part of his constitutional freedom. He is free to decline the employment on
those terms, . . . .”).
116
Id. at 8–9.
117
Id. at 21.
113
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land.”118 In other words, this was a private transaction between
private parties, which the government had no right to interfere
with.
As for the statement by the Kansas Supreme Court
acknowledging that actual inequality existed between employers
and their employees because employees were not as financially
independent as employers, Justice Pitney replied:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there
must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally
happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally
unhampered by circumstances. This applies to all contracts . . . .
Indeed, a little reflection will show that wherever the right of
private property and the right of free contract coexist, each party
when contracting is inevitably more or less influenced by the
question whether he has much property, or little, or none . . . .
And, since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in
common, some persons must have more property than others, it
is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of
contract and the right of private property without at the same
time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that
are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.119

In short, the actual inequality that the Supreme Court
acknowledged existed was cast as the by-product of “private
parties exercising their private rights,” much in the same way that
inequality was understood following Emancipation.120 Moreover,
and based on the Court’s rhetoric, the fact that contracts and
contract law play(ed) central roles in facilitating and perpetuating
such “inequalities of fortune” could and should be overlooked.
While subsequent cases are not as explicit as Coppage about
the status of the parties or their rights, the courts have remained
committed to the assumptions that the parties to a contract are
roughly equal in terms of their rights and capable of taking care of
themselves in their private market transactions without the need
for intervention from the State, notwithstanding any inequality
between them. One more case, decided eighty-five years after
Coppage, will have to suffice to illustrate the extent to which these
contract law assumptions have been reproduced widely and
consistently over time.

118
119
120

Id. at 11.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
Gary Peller, Privilege, 104 GEO. L.J. 883, 889 (2016).
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In Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., the plaintiff, Paulette Flynn,
worked for the defendant, AerChem, from August or September of
1995 until September 10, 1999.121 As an employee at will,
AerChem could fire Flynn for any reason or no reason at all. In
October of 1998, Flynn was asked to and did sign an “Employee
Arbitration Agreement” (the “Agreement”) with AerChem, which
obligated Flynn to submit any claims arising out of her
employment with AerChem to arbitration.122 The arbitration
agreement was part of an employee handbook that all of
AerChem’s employees were asked to sign.123 It is not clear from
the opinion why Flynn left AerChem’s employment. But Flynn
sued AerChem on January 28, 2000, for, among other things,
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.124 In
response, AerChem filed a motion to compel arbitration of Flynn’s
claims, which the district court granted. 125
Flynn argued that a valid contract to arbitrate was not formed
because she never consented to the Agreement.126 In rejecting
Flynn’s argument, Chief Judge Sarah Evans Barker held that
Flynn’s failure to understand what she agreed to in the Arbitration
Agreement was “not a viable excuse for non-performance.”127
Instead, Judge Barker stated, “[i]t is a basic tenet of contract law
that a person is assumed to have read and understood documents
that they sign.”128 Judge Barker then explained that, “ ‘[t]he
freedom to contract includes the freedom to contract
improvidently, and in the absence of countervailing policy
considerations, private reservations or mistake[s] will not avoid
the results of apparent consent.’ ”129 As a result, Flynn’s signature
on the agreement constituted her consent to the agreement,
notwithstanding that she did not have full knowledge of its terms
or what they meant.130
Flynn then argued that the Agreement was not enforceable
because her agreement to arbitrate all of her claims was the

121

102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
Id. at 1057.
123
Flynn claimed that everyone was forced to sign the Agreement. Id. at 1060.
124
Id. at 1057.
125
Id. at 1063
126
Id. at 1060.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rutter v. Excel Indust., Inc., 438 N.E.2d
1030, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)).
130
Id. at 1061.
122
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product of economic duress and unconscionability.131 To prove
duress, Flynn was required to prove that “the duress resulted from
the defendant’s wrongful and oppressive conduct and not by the
plaintiff’s necessities.”132 Judge Barker concluded that Flynn
failed to satisfy her burden and, therefore, her duress claim
failed.133
To begin with, Judge Barker held that AerChem’s threat to
fire Flynn if she did not sign the Agreement to Arbitrate was not
wrongful because, as an at-will employee, AerChem had the right
to terminate Flynn at any time with or without cause.134 Thus,
according to Judge Barker, AerChem simply did what it had a
legal right to do.135 Judge Barker also concluded that Flynn did
not need to give in to AerChem’s threat to fire her if she did not
sign the Agreement.136 Judge Barker acknowledged that losing
her job with AerChem “might have caused Flynn some
inconvenience, considering the economic hardship she faced due to
her pending divorce.”137 But, according to Judge Barker, Flynn
had other options available to her, because AerChem’s threat “did
not rob her of her volition.”138 More specifically, Judge Barker
stated that, “Flynn at all times retained the option of refusing to
sign the Agreement and seeking other employment, if
necessary.”139 Finally, Judge Barker concluded that “Flynn’s
personal decisions, not AerChem’s actions, were the cause of her
economic duress.”140 Flynn’s financial distress was caused by her
pending divorce and not because AerChem threatened to fire her
if she refused to sign the Agreement.141 According to Judge
Barker, the fact that “AerChem may have been well aware of and
exploited her situation” in no way changed the conclusion that “no
act or omission by AerChem was the source of her financial
troubles.”142 In other words, Flynn was responsible for the
unfortunate situation she found herself in.

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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To prove unconscionability, Flynn was required to prove that
there was great disparity in bargaining power between the parties
that essentially caused the weaker party to sign an agreement
unwillingly or without awareness of its terms and the agreement
so signed was one that “no person not under delusion, duress or in
distress would make, or one that no honest and fair [person] would
accept.”143 The fact that one party merely “enjoys an advantage
over the other” is not sufficient to make a contract
unconscionable.144
Judge Barker acknowledged that there was some actual
disparity in bargaining power between AerChem and Flynn but
nevertheless concluded that, “the disparity was not great enough
to sustain a finding of unconscionability.”145 Judge Barker
reasoned that, “[a]lthough AerChem had the power to terminate
Flynn’s employment, Flynn possessed the corresponding power to
refuse to sign and leave its employ, thereby withholding her
services from AerChem.”146 This reasoning was remarkably
More
similar to Justice Pitney’s reasoning in Coppage.147
specifically, Flynn’s right to quit her job and look for other work,
regardless of whether other work would be difficult to find (as
Judge Barker did not comment on this), was enough to counter
AerChem’s right to threaten to fire her and eliminate her source
of income. Flynn, in other words, had enough rights to take care
of herself. Finally, because mandatory arbitration agreements are
“commonplace in the employment setting,” Judge Barker
concluded that the Arbitration Agreement at issue in the case was
not one that “no sensible person not under delusion or distress
would make, and such as no honest and fair man would accept.”148
Consequently, Flynn’s unconscionability claim failed, too.149
Based on how the world is supposed to work,150 therefore,
Paulette Flynn was simply not entitled to any help from the State
through its courts in sorting out her private transaction with her
employer, AerChem. Yes, there was actual inequality between the
parties; and yes, AerChem’s threat to fire Flynn may have caused
143

Id (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915); see also supra notes 106–07 and
accompanying text.
148
Flynn, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
149
Id. at 1063.
150
See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
144
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Flynn some “inconvenience;” and, yes AerChem may have
“exploited her situation.”151 But Flynn had enough rights to
protect her own interests and failed to do so. Instead, her own
“personal decisions” put her in the difficult financial situation she
found herself in, namely, choosing to get a divorce and voluntarily
entering into the arbitration agreement with AerChem (instead of
choosingo lose her job and source of income).152 Then, as now,
equal rights, personal responsibility, individual effort, and
decision-making dictated the outcome.
III. REALITY
So, what happens when this understanding of how the world
is supposed to work—that inequality is simply the result of private
parties pursuing their own private interests in private
transactions through the exercise of their equal private rights—is
transposed on the real world? What are the practical effects of this
ideology? Briefly revisiting the housing market crash that
precipitated the Great Recession of 2007–2009 provides an
example of the devastating social consequences that contracts and
contract law sometimes help produce and the skewed response to
those consequences that are engendered, at least in part, because
we cling to the fiction that contracts and contract law have nothing
to do with inequality.153
Beginning in the early 2000s, mortgage lending expanded
dramatically. A large portion of this lending consisted of predatory
subprime loans. These loans included refinancing transactions
where homeowners would borrow against the equity of their
homes.154 They also included loans to purchase single family
homes that targeted younger, single or divorced women of color
living in minority neighborhoods.155 But even amongst this
151

Flynn, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
Id.
153
A lot has been written about the housing market crash and the Great
Recession. See generally JANIS SARRA & CHERYL WADE, PREDATORY LENDING AND
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN DREAM (2020); see COLIN MCARTHUR
& SARAH EDELMAN, CTR. AM. PROGRESS, THE 2008 HOUSING CRISIS: DON’T BLAME
FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAMS FOR WALL STREET’S RECKLESSNESS 1, 4 (2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/04/13/430424/2008housing-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/SD5Q-2NJV]. See infra note 155, for a discussion of
the housing crisis studies. Again, because this Article is only a primer, I only attempt
to outline the basics, as opposed to all of the nuances about the housing market crash.
154
MCARTHUR & EDELMAN, supra note 153, at 4.
155
See ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM.,
WOMEN ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR SUBPRIME LENDING: WOMEN ARE
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demographic, African American women were disproportionately
represented.156 In many cases, the people to whom these loans
were sold did not qualify for them.157 But the lenders never told
them this. Some of the predatory terms common in these
subprime loans included high prepayment penalty provisions, very
high origination and post-origination fees (totaling 20% of the
entire loan amount), and a 2/28 adjustable-rate mortgage.158
Subprime loans, like the ones mentioned above, were made
possible because lenders funded these mortgages by bundling
them into mortgage-backed securities, which were then sold as

DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED IN HIGH-COST MORTGAGE MARKET 1–4 (2006)
(finding that “[w]omen[,] [particularly African-American and Latino women, were]
more likely to receive subprime mortgages than men”); CAPITAL AREA ASSET
BUILDERS ET AL., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: A
STUDY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, SECURITIES AND BANKING 1, 7, 10, 14–
15 (2008) (finding that subprime loans were disproportionately made to low income,
African-American borrowers); CONSUMERS UNION SWRO, WOMEN IN THE SUBPRIME
MARKET 1–2 (2002) (data from Texas); IRA GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE REINVESTMENT
FUND, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE FILINGS IN MARYLAND: A STUDY BY THE
REINVESTMENT FUND FOR THE BALTIMORE HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION
COALITION 6, 26, 34 (2008) (finding that African-Americans living in predominantly
African-American neighborhoods received a higher percentage of subprime loans than
other racial categories, and that most loans in foreclosure were obtained for home
purchases rather than refinances); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and
Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1089 (2009)
(“[I]n 2006, 42.4 percent of first-lien subprime loans were purchase loans.”)
156
See, e.g., FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 155, at 1; see also CONSUMERS
UNION SWRO, supra note 156, at 1–4 (data from Texas); SARRA & WADE, supra note
153, at 2, 10.
157
Qualifying for a loan is the process by which a lender determines the likelihood
that the borrower applying for a loan will be able to repay the loan according to its
terms. Nathaniel R. Hull, Comment, Crossing the Line: Prime, Subprime, and
Predatory Lending, 61 ME. L. REV. 287, 288 (2009). Lenders generally use several
established criteria to determine whether a borrower qualifies for a home mortgage
loan: the borrower’s credit score—usually a FICO score higher than 660;
documentation of income, debt, employment, and assets (including financial resources
and other property or collateral); and “a loan amount less than the maximum size loan
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are allowed to purchase.” Id. at 292 & nn. 33–34
(footnotes omitted); see also How Do I Qualify for a Mortgage?, INCHARGE DEBT SOLS.,
https://www.incharge.org/housing/how-do-i-qualify-for-a-mortgage/
[https://perma.cc/87J3-WYBW] (last visited Sept. 27, 2021). If a borrower satisfies the
criteria, she qualifies for a prime mortgage, which is a mortgage at the best interest
rate then available. If she does not meet the criteria, then she generally only qualifies
for a subprime mortgage, which is a mortgage at a higher interest rate. Hull, supra,
at 292.
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Bar-Gill, supra note 155, at 1076–77; see Julia Kagan, 2/28 Adjustable-Rate
Mortgage (2/28 ARM), INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
2/228arm.asp [https://perma.cc/4DXH-LD89].
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investment instruments to investors around the world.159 Because
loans, even these very risky loans, were being made available to
more people, more people wanted to purchase houses. Lenders,
therefore, sold a lot more of these predatory subprime mortgages
to other people. As a result of the increased demand for houses
and the resulting decrease in the supply of homes, housing prices
went up and initially kept going up. This created an “asset bubble”
in the housing market.160
But the bubble was unsustainable. The downward spiral in
the housing market went something like this: When housing prices
peaked, selling homes became more difficult, which resulted in
rising mortgage loss rates for lenders and investors. Mortgagebacked securities were then labeled high-risk, some subprime
lenders closed up shop and others either stopped making or
restricted access to sub-prime loans all of which lowered the
demand for homes.161 Lower demand led to lower housing prices.162
In addition, the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate.163
This sent the adjustable mortgage interest rates skyrocketing.164
Because most subprime loans sold between 2003–2007 that were
bundled into the mortgage-backed securities included adjustablerate mortgages, this meant that the monthly payments due under
those mortgages also soared.165 Buyers could no longer afford their
monthly payments, which meant that more and more buyers
started to default on their loans.166 As more buyers either
defaulted or became delinquent on their mortgage loans,
foreclosures increased, banks repossessed more homes, and both
buyers and the banks tried to sell these homes in a now weakened
housing market, which further reduced housing prices and
159

John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis 2007-2010, FED. RES. HIST.,
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime-mortgage-crisis (last visited
Oct. 2, 2021).
160
Kimberly Amadeo, The Causes of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, BALANCE (Sept.
17, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/what-caused-the-subprime-mortgage-crisis
[https://perma.cc/BA8D-6KWU].
161
Duca, supra note 159.
162
Amadeo, supra note 160.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Bar-Gill, supra note 155, at 1098 (“According to the [Federal Reserve Board],
approximately three-fourths of originations in securitized subprime ‘pools’ from 2003
to 2007 were ARMs or hybrids with two- or three-year ‘teaser’ rates followed by
substantial increases in the rate and payment (so-called ‘2-28’ and ‘3-27’ mortgages).”);
SARRA & WADE, supra note 153, at 8 (“Of the $600 billion of sub-prime loans originated
in 2006, most were securitized.”) (footnote omitted).
166
Amadeo, supra note 160.
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demand.167 The housing market crashed and, as a result, the
mortgage-backed securities became worthless, which then
precipitated the Great Recession.168
At the outset of the Great Recession, trillions of dollars in
risky mortgages were circulating through the financial system169
and banks, financial institutions and investors were facing
hundreds of billions of dollars in losses.170 According to Janis
Sarra and Cheryl Wade, subsequent investigations found that
collusion between market players, careless and predatory lending
practices, securitization, fraudulent and egregious conduct by
lenders and mortgage servicers, “shadow banking” resulting from
deregulation, complicity of credit rating agencies, and failures of
regulatory oversight all contributed to the housing market crash
and Great Recession.171
It is very clear, therefore, that a lot of things contributed to
the housing market crash and Great Recession. But overlooked in
all of this is the fact that at the heart of the housing market bubble
and subsequent crash were countless individual contracts in the
form of mostly subprime mortgage loans.172 Each mortgage loan
was a contract between two private parties—a lender and a
borrower. But the private parties to these ostensibly private
contracts were treated very differently by the State.173
The Borrowers: Most of these individual mortgage contracts
were found to be valid and enforceable. More specifically, unless
each of the individual borrowers was able to rebut the presumption
of contract validity that springs into existence when a contract is
formed,174 which is extremely hard to do,175 each of those contracts
would have been deemed valid. In addition, all of these cases
167

Duca, supra note 159.
Amadeo, supra note 160.
169
SARRA & WADE, supra note 153, at 51.
170
Id. at 51–53.
171
Id. at 23–68; see also Hart, Contract Law Now, supra note 108, at 36–39
(discussing a very brief regulatory history of the financial market); Amadeo, supra
note 160.
172
Amadeo, supra note 160
173
MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 120 (2015).
174
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. Borrowers could try to rebut
the presumption of contract validity either by suing their lenders to rescind their
contracts or otherwise get out of having to continue to perform them or raising claims
to rebut the presumption as a defense in a lawsuit brought by the lenders. Query how
many borrowers would have actually been able to sue or mount a defense in a lawsuit,
given that so many of them defaulted on their mortgagers.
175
See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
168
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would have been decided against a backdrop in which courts held
that lenders: (1) owed no fiduciary duty to borrowers;176 (2) had no
duty to disclose whether borrowers actually qualified for the loans
they were sold;177 (3) had no duty to determine the borrowers’
ability to repay the loan;178 (4) had no duty to refrain from making
loans to borrowers whom the lenders knew could not repay the
loan;179 and (5) had no duty to give borrowers the best rates180—all

176

Oaks Mgmt. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 570 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[I]t
is established that absent special circumstances . . . a loan transaction is at armslength and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and lender.”);
Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 283 Cal. Rptr. 53, 60 n.1 (Ct. App. 1991)
(rejecting breach of fiduciary duty claim by borrower and holding instead that the
claim failed as a matter of law); Pimental v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 2d
32, 39 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that lenders owe no fiduciary duty to borrowers).
The relationship between a lending institution and its borrower-client is not
fiduciary in nature. A commercial lender is entitled to pursue its own
economic interests in a loan transaction. This right is inconsistent with the
obligations of a fiduciary which require that the fiduciary knowingly agree
to subordinate its interests to act on behalf of and for the benefit of another.
Nymark, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 55 n.1 (citations omitted).
177
Cross v. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass’n, No. CV 09–317 CAS (SSx), 2009 WL
481482, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (holding that the financial institution “had no
duty to disclose to [the borrower] that he could not qualify for the loan”); cf. Baylor v.
Jordan, 445 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1984) (“Courts have traditionally viewed the
relationship between a bank and its customer as a creditor-debtor relationship which
does not impose a fiduciary duty of disclosure on the bank.”); Nymark, 283 Cal. Rptr.
at 56 (“[A]s a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower
when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope
of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.”); In re Vincent v. Ameriquest
Mortg. Co., 381 B.R. 564, 574 (Bankr. D. Mass., Rosenthal 2008) (holding that plaintiff
failed to allege facts that would impose a fiduciary duty on defendant (lender) “to make
sure that the loan was suitable based on her circumstances”).
178
Renteria v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 922 (D. Ariz. 2006) (“[T]he
world might well be a better place if lenders had a duty to the borrower to determine
the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. No such duty exists. The lender’s efforts to
determine the creditworthiness and ability to repay by a borrower are for the lender’s
protection, not the borrower’s.”); Norwich Sav. Soc’y v. Caldrello, No. CV89-512204,
1993 WL 268512, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 1993) (“A bank does not have a duty
to investigate a borrower’s ability to repay the loan.”); Anderson v. Franklin, No. 2:09cv-11096, 2010 WL 742765, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2010).
179
Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the
lenders did not owe a duty of care to the borrowers in approving the loan); N. Tr. Co.
v. VIII S. Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“The lender also
has no duty to refrain from making a loan if the lender knows or should know that the
borrower cannot repay the loan.”).
180
See, e.g., Brazier v. Sec. Pac. Mortg., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (W.D.
Wash. 2003) (holding that no law requires a mortgage broker to negotiate for a
borrower to obtain the best rate from the lender).
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of which, of course, was contrary to the understanding of most
borrowers.181
Moreover, given that each of these mortgage loan transactions
would have been seen as private transactions between private
parties pursuing their private rights, ideologically, courts would
not be inclined to step in to protect the borrowers from what
turned out to be their own bad decision to enter into the contract,
notwithstanding any wrong-doing by the lenders or the fact that
actual inequality existed between lenders and borrowers.182
Commentators made these ideological arguments explicitly. For
example, “[m]any pundits, politicians, and even some wellrespected academics made the completely unsupported claim that
the financial crisis was caused by poor people borrowing money to
buy homes they could not afford.”183 Borrowers were called
“greedy”184 people who lacked “personal responsibility”185 and
failed to exercise “due diligence” before entering into their loans.186
Consequently, because of the ideology at work and the fact that
these mortgage loan contracts would have been deemed valid, the
State, through its courts, enforced them.
The Lenders: The ideology of personal responsibility and
individual effort and decision-making, however, was not deployed
against the lenders and banks which were largely responsible for
the housing market crash and Great Recession. Nor, when it came
to the banks and lenders, was the sanctity of these private loan
transactions honored as spaces where private parties were
supposed to be left to fend entirely for themselves in the pursuit of
their private interests through the exercise of their equal private
181
See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 32 (2008) (“The 2002 Fannie Mae National Housing Survey found that over
half of all African-American and Hispanic borrowers erroneously believed that lenders
are required by law to provide the best possible loan rates.”).
182
See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan’s work
on the psychology of judgement and decision-making adds support for this conclusion.
Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 40, at 1782–84. Wilkinson-Ryan’s work shows that people
tend to support enforcement of contracts, specifically, holding the non-drafting party
to the terms of their agreements; and people hold this view even when there is
evidence of procedural defects or wrongdoing by contract drafters during the
formation process. Id. at 1782. Unless people are specifically prompted to consider
process defects or drafter wrongdoing, therefore, they tend to understand
“transactional harms,” like being on the receiving end of a bad bargain, “as products
of . . . consent.” Id.
183
BARADARAN, supra note 173, at 120.
184
Id.
185
SARRA & WADE, supra note 153, at 97 (citation omitted).
186
Id. (citation omitted).
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rights. Instead, all of these individual mortgage loans were
aggregated; and when aggregated, these same mortgage contracts
made the banks too big to fail. So the federal government bailed
them out.
Congress enacted The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008,187 which created the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (“TARP”).188 Pursuant to TARP, the United States
Treasury Department was authorized to purchase up to $250
billion in bank shares in an effort to provide banks with muchneeded capital.189
But aggregation, and therefore help from the State, only
worked in favor of one of the two parties to these private mortgage
transactions, namely, the banks and lenders. However, when it
came to the other party to these mortgage contracts—the
borrowers—these very same mortgage contracts were
disaggregated and viewed as single, private transactions between
private parties.190 As such, government intervention no longer
seemed warranted. The borrowers, who were the homeowners in
these mortgage transactions, were apparently not worthy of being
saved.
Another way to think about all of this, therefore, is to say that
a contract is usually a private transaction between private parties
exercising their private rights, unless the State determines
otherwise. And in cases involving private transactions between
private parties, any inequality that might be a byproduct of those
transactions can and should be ignored. But, if one of the
contracting parties is deemed by the State as “too big to fail,” then
the State will step in to relieve that party from its own decisionmaking.
The effects of this skewed response from the State to the
contracting parties at the center of these mortgage loan contracts
are still being felt today. More specifically, as a result of the lifesaving efforts by the State, many of the country’s biggest banks
are actually bigger now than they were before the Great Recession.
For example, a 2018 story in the Washington Post reported that:
JP Morgan Chase had $1.5 trillion in assets in 2007 and $2.5

187

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5261).
188
Troubled Asset Relief Program, 12 U.S.C. § 5211.
189
See, e.g., Marc Davis, US Government Financial Bailouts, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 24,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/government-financialbailout.asp#bank-rescue-of-2008-or-the-great-recession [https://perma.cc/9ZJQ-NA6A].
190
SARRA & WADE, supra note 153, at 11.
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trillion in assets in 2018; Bank of America had $1.7 trillion in
assets in 2007 and $2.3 trillion in 2018; and Wells Fargo’s $2
trillion in assets were more than double what they were before the
Great Recession.191
African Americans, however, are not faring nearly as well. A
few statistics will have to suffice to paint this bleak picture:
• In 2005, 59% of African American households’ net worth was
in the form of equity in their homes.192 The 53% drop in net
worth of African American households from $12,124 in 2005
to $5,677, therefore, was largely attributed to the housing
market crash.193
• Between 2007–2010, during the Great Recession, median
wealth for all racial groups fell by approximately 30%.194 But
for African American families, their wealth continued to fall
another 20% over the next three years.195
• In 2016, median black wealth was $13,460, which was about
half of what it was just before the Great Recession.196 In
2016, average black wealth ($102,477) was still
approximately one-third less than it was before the Great
Recession ($154,557).197

A 2019 report by the Institute of Policy Studies found that,
“[b]etween 1983 and 2016, the median Black family saw their
wealth drop by more than half after adjusting for inflation . . . .”198
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Renae Merle, A Guide to the Financial Crisis—10 Years Later, WASH. POST (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-guide-to-the-financialcrisis—10-years-later/2018/09/10/114b76ba-af10-11e8-a20b 5f4f84429666_story.html.
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/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7WV-GR8M].
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Neil Bhutta et al., Disparities in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019
Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. (last updated Sept. 28, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-byrace-and-ethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm
[https://perma.cc/CUU7-QGHJ].
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Id.
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ANGELA HANKS ET AL., CTR. AM. PROGESS, SYSTEMATIC INEQUALITY: HOW
AMERICA’S STRUCTURAL RACISM HELPED CREATE THE BLACK-WHITE WEALTH GAP 9,
10 (2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2018/02/21/447051/
systematic-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/KJJ7-39BP].
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Id. at 10.
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CHUCK COLLINS ET AL., INST. POL’Y STUD., DREAMS DEFERRED: HOW
ENRICHING THE 1% WIDENS THE RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE 1, 3 (2019),
https://inequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/IPS_RWD-Report_FINAL1.15.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR77-JBAZ].
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That same median Black family owned $3,600 in 2019.199
According to the authors of the same report, “[i]f the trajectory of
the past three decades continues, by 2050 . . . Black median
wealth will be $600. The median Black family is on track to reach
zero wealth by 2082.”200
To be blunt, the Haves come out ahead. Again. Despite the
fact that the Great Recession occurred in 2006–2008, the result for
many African Americans who were targeted for predatory
subprime loans is eerily similar to what happened with Edmund,
the recently emancipated slave, in 1869. Recall that after
performing the contract with the landowner, Edmund did not end
up with any of the profits from the sale of the cotton harvested and
instead ended up indebted to the landowner for the provisions he
was provided.201 Like Edmund, these targeted African Americans
in roughly 2009 also came away with nothing, because they lost
their homes, and ended up indebted to the banks for the balance
of their mortgage loans. Even given the parallels between these
stories, it should still come as a shock to learn that, “[i]n 1863,
black Americans owned one-half of 1 percent of the national
wealth. Today [2019] it’s just over 1.5 percent for roughly the same
percentage of the overall population.”202 Words at this point are
simply inadequate.
CONCLUSION
Inequality is an intractable and complex problem that has
plagued this country for well over two centuries now. Given our
history, there is no denying that inequality is racialized. But
there is a particular urgency to discussions about inequality right
now because the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed in appalling
detail the extent of racial and economic inequality in American
society. And, as with the Great Recession, contracts are at the
heart of many of the problems confronting individuals currently
dealing with the havoc wrought by COVID-19. From housing and
food, to health insurance and employment, contracts are literally
everywhere. So, unless we decide to do things differently,
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including but certainly not limited to acknowledging that the dayto-day practice of contracts and contract law create and perpetuate
inequality in American society, it seems very likely that we will be
doomed to repeat the trauma of the Great Recession. The Haves
will be bailed out.203 But the Have Nots will end up being evicted
from their homes,204 and they will remain on the hook to their
landlords for the back-rent.205

203

In fact, the State has already acted to shore up the economy. The Federal
Reserve acted quickly to shore up the U.S. economy during the COVID-19 pandemic,
including, but not limited to, lending $2.3 trillion to support different sectors of the
economy (state and local governments, households, businesses), slashing interest
rates to almost zero, and making a slew of asset purchases. See Jeffrey Cheng et al.,
What’s the Fed Doing in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis? What More Could It Do?,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-tocovid19/ [https://perma.cc/6RPP-BXXA].
204
The federal eviction moratorium is set to expire on Oct. 3, 2021. See Ann O’Connell,
Emergency Bans on Evictions and Other Tenant Protections Related to Coronavirus, NOLO
(Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.nolo.com/evictions-ban/ [https://perma.cc/VF4K-57EE].
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See Jessica Schneider, DOJ Files Appeal of Trump-Appointed Judge’s Ruling on
CDC Eviction Moratorium, CNN (Feb. 27, 2021, 9:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/02
/27/politics/doj-appeal-cdc-eviction-moratorium/index.html
[https://perma.cc/W6EJQCPF]. The CDC eviction moratorium was set to expire at the end of December but was
extended via a provision in the second stimulus package through January and that
President Biden extended the moratorium again through March. Id. But the article also
notes that, “[u]nder the order, rent is not canceled or forgiven and landlords can evict
tenants after the moratorium ends if they are not able to pay the back rent.”

